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It may be that the next great developments in 
the social sciences will come not from pro-
fessed social scientists but from people trained 
in other fields. 
—George Lundberg,  
Foundations of Sociology
A vital notion for all historical sciences, the term 
“evolution” has a myriad of meanings and definitions 
that form the basis of explanations and evoke a range 
of reactions from advocates and critics. In general, 
however, the term basically refers to change. In this in-
nocuous sense, most archaeologists would likely con-
sider themselves as evolutionists as the archaeological 
record is, by its nature, a record of change. In fact, one 
of the primary reasons we study the archaeological re-
cord is because what exists today is different from that 
of the past and thus archaeology is the study of that 
change. It is conceivable that few archaeologists would 
argue that the discipline is evolutionary if the word 
“evolution” is limited to this basic connotation. 
While there is little controversy about evolution as 
change, explaining change is another matter entirely, 
and in this sense the topic of evolution provokes the 
great emotion among proponents with different no-
tions of what evolution means. It is useful, then, to de-
lineate a series of technical meanings for the concept 
of evolution that are helpful to distinguish the various 
explanatory frameworks that that the word connotes. 
EVOLUTION AS TRANSFORMATION
The first meaning is one that invokes the idea of trans-
formation. Indeed, its etymology traces back to seven-
teenth-century roots as a word that means “to unfold, 
open out, expand.” The general concept here is one of 
transformation that occurs due to innate properties 
and internal activities. In this sense of evolution, two 
factors are commonly identified as the source of these 
transformations: the direct influence of the environ-
ment, through an inheritance of acquired characters 
and an intrinsic drive toward a definite goal, particu-
larly toward greater perfection (Mayr 2001:77). 
The first factor, the environment, centers on the 
notion that the external world makes things change, 
but it does not specify how, which is one reason why 
evolution is sometimes confused with environmental 
determinism. The acquired characters factor was ini-
tially proposed by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829) 
to be the engine behind evolution. Lamarckian evolu-
tion states that change occurs because entities pass on 
traits to their offspring that they acquire during their 
lifetimes. 
The intrinsic drive related to a goal is one of the 
most commonly invoked mechanisms for transforma-
tional evolution and is related to change in the form 
of development (Carneiro 2003). Here evolution is 
considered to be change that is directional, a direction 
that is often associated with progress (Dunnell 1988). 
While occasionally invoked in biology (Niteki 1988; 
Ruse 1997), this finds predominate usage in various 
forms of cultural evolution, which holds that hu-
man populations transform themselves, progressing 
measurably along a yardstick of progress that is often 
referred to as complexity (Carneiro 2003). 
Cultural evolution in anthropology dates to the 
nineteenth century (Morgan 1877; Spencer 1887; Tylor 
1865). During much of the twentieth century, cultural 
evolution was largely a European concept (Childe 1944; 
Figuier 1870; Peake 1928) and was rejected by the ma-
jority of Americanist anthropologists (Holmes 1892). 
It was revitalized in the 1960s, however, through the 
work of Leslie White (1959). As a result of this revital-
ization and New Archaeology’s interest in developing 
explicit frameworks for explaining change, cultural 
evolution emerged to form many of the underlying 
principles of contemporary archaeological explana-
tions (Binford 1968; Flannery 1972, 1986; Kirch 1990; 
Sahlins and Service 1960; Service 1975; Spencer 1990; 
Wright 1986; Yoffee and Cowgill 1992). Cultural evo-
lution approaches assume that change occurs due to 
responses by past populations, whether that is labeled 
as an adaptation to some stimulus (Binford 1968; 
Boserup 1965; Carneiro 1970; Cohen 1977; Flannery 
1972; Kirch 1980) or, more recently, agency in which 
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change occurs due to the internal actions of individu-
als within a population in response to perceived states 
in the environment (Dobres and Robb 2005; Pauketat 
2001; see Gardner, chapter 7). 
EVOLUTION AS CHANGE IN VARIABILITY
The forms of cultural evolution just described are 
quite distinct from the notion of evolution that under-
lies biology and is the basis of evolutionary approaches 
to archaeology and anthropology. This kind of evolu-
tion is often recognized as Darwinian evolution due to 
its origins. The confusing part is that on the surface, 
explanations made using cultural and Darwinian evo-
lution take a similar form. Darwinian evolutionary 
explanations explore “any net directional change or 
cumulative change in the characteristics of organ-
isms and populations over many generations” (Endler 
1986:5). This basic definition for Darwinian evolution 
is remarkably similar to the transformation notion of 
evolution: both treat change as directional. 
The Darwinian definition, however, belies two of 
the basic tenets of biological evolution. The first tenet 
of Darwinian evolution is that variation is causal. At 
any point in time, things vary with respect to each 
other, and this variability produces change. Variation 
is causal because the interaction between variability 
and the external world produces differential success. 
So we explain change due to the details of that vari-
ability—how one variant is different than another. 
The second tenet of Darwinian evolution is that the 
mechanism of change is external to the things that we 
are explaining; change results from the interaction of 
entities with the external environment and/or with 
other entities. What is seen as the external selective en-
vironment and what is selected is the source of much 
of debate, as discussed in this chapter—should we 
consider humans as being selected by their environ-
ment, artifacts as selected by humans, or even humans 
selected by their artifacts or environments modified 
by humans? Because various approaches differ in their 
Table 8.1.  Dimensions of Variability in Evolutionary 
Approaches
Dimension Variability
Temporal scale Long  <-> Short
Variation Artifacts <->Behavio 
   <-> Ideas (Memes)
Transmission Vertical <->Horizontal
Subject and object of Humans <-> Artifacts 
 selection (Intentionality)  <-> Environment
Sorting mechanisms  Natural selection, 
   transmission, drift, 
   phenotypic plasticity
emphases (table 8.1), this leads to a fascinating, almost 
philosophical debate over human intentionality, as 
discussed below.
In any case, once these subjects and objects are 
identified, the tenets above form the basic foundation 
of Darwinian evolution in which change is explained 
as the result of a two-step process. First, variability ex-
ists. Second, some portion of that variability persists, 
some does not. While that may be agreed on, the mil-
lion-dollar question is how and why do some things 
persist and become more common at the expense 
of others? While natural selection—the differential 
persistence of certain traits over others—is usually the 
null hypothesis in biology, when explaining change in 
human culture the answer is prone to debate (often 
heated) in almost every case. Other chapters in this 
handbook describe other mechanisms for evolution-
ary change, such as drift (see Collard et al., chapter 
13) or self-organization (see Bentley and Maschner, 
chapter 15), and there much debate over when and 
where natural selection predominates in the process of 
culture change (see Collard et al., chapter 13; Gabora, 
chapter 17). However, there can be no doubt at least 
that on some time scale (e.g., our evolution from 
australopithecines) that natural selection has acted. 
Hence a chapter on evolutionary approaches needs to 
define natural selection. The differential persistence of 
entities can be explained as the result of natural selec-
tion for evolution of trait T if and only if:
1.  Entities vary with respect to T (VARIABILITY)
and
2.  Different variants of T confer differing probabili-
ties of survival and/or replication on the entities. 
(FITNESS)
and
3.  Entities transmit their variants of T with better-
than-chance fidelity through successive replica-
tions. (INHERITANCE)
Based on this definition, one can readily appreci-
ate how natural selection is different than a transfor-
mational type of evolution in which entities change 
themselves. Natural selection is not an event per se, 
but an explanation of a statistical outcome in which 
variability has been differentially sorted. Natural selec-
tion simply explains the distribution of entities in time 
and across space. Second, evolution is what one might 
consider a mechanistic explanation, in that the enti-
ties provide just the materials (variability) on which 
change acts. Third, rate of change is not specified. Al-
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though evolution is often thought to be gradual, noth-
ing in the theory requires this. Evolution by natural 
selection may result in change or stabilization, and can 
be fast or slow. Finally, natural selection does not need 
to be a result of nature—the natural environment—as 
our own minds and the minds of other people are also 
a highly selective environment for ideas and behaviors 
(see Gabora, chapter 17).
Finally, as variants are passed on from entity to 
entity, natural selection requires that different vari-
ants vary in how they affect the degree of persistence 
of entities. This is what is meant by the concept of fit-
ness—how well any particular variant (the definition 
of the variant often being half the challenge) persists 
relative to others. Natural selection (and the notion 
of fitness) does not require any particular empirical 
event such as death or even birth for it to be invoked 
as part of an explanation. Although often associated 
with these when it comes to understanding biological 
change, the definition of natural selection is silent with 
respect to how variation in persistence occurs, that is, 
whether variant frequencies change in accordance to 
how they differentially replicate or differentially sur-
vive. This means that two different researchers might 
choose different descriptions for the same thing—one 
might describe some behavior that spreads relative to 
another, whereas another would refer to selection of 
one behavior over another. Neither has said anything 
yet about why one behavior gained frequency over 
another, which is important to recognize, so that one 
can go on investigating the phenomenon rather than 
get tangled up in debates over semantics!
EVOLUTION IN ANTHROPOLOGY AND 
ARCHAEOLOGY
When generally framed, the integration of evolu-
tionary principles into social anthropology and ar-
chaeology requires only minor reconceptualization 
of replication. Although we are most familiar with 
biological entities that pass on information through 
the physical expression of genes, evolution is not re-
stricted to just biology. The first recognized means by 
which variability is transmitted and the best studied 
is genetics. Genes are the units we give to information 
passed on between entities during biological repli-
cation. Genes, however, are not the only means by 
which variability can be passed between entities. Since 
no particular transmission is specified in Darwinian 
evolution, other kinds of mechanisms are possible. 
Consequently, it is now understood that culture con-
stitutes a second (in addition to genes) mechanism by 
which inheritance occurs. The inheritance of culture 
(cultural transmission) was specifically introduced to 
account for variability and similarity in behavioral 
traits, as opposed to morphological traits in animals 
(Bonner 1980). 
The transmission of nongenetic information be-
tween individuals surprisingly common among or-
ganisms and is not limited to humans. Accumulating 
empirical evidence shows that animal behaviors are 
often passed on between individuals and are indepen-
dent of genetic or environmental changes (Bonner 
1980; Heyes and Galef 1996; McGrew 1992; Nishida 
1986; Rendell and Whitehead 2001). Biologists have 
recorded instances of cultural inheritance among dol-
phins (Krützen et al. 2005), orca whales (Ford 1991), 
primates (Biro et al. 2003), elephants (Poole et al. 
2005), fish (Brown and Laland 2003), and birds (Fritz 
and Kotraschal 1999; Grant and Grant 1996; Lynch 
1996). Although many early models of cultural trans-
mission were based largely on analogies derived from 
genetics (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman 1981), more recent models have considered 
the characters of cultural transmission that involve the 
continuous inheritance and acquisition of informa-
tion without empirically definable generations (Bet-
tinger and Eerkens 1999; Lipo et al. 1997; Neff 2001; 
Neiman 1995; Shennan and Wilkinson 2001). Discus-
sion continues about the degree to which biological 
models can be used to explain cultural variability, both 
pro (Collard and Shennan 2000; Shennan and Collard 
2005) and con (Terrell 1988; Terrell et al. 1997; Welsh 
et al. 1992).
Given the expansion of evolutionary theory to in-
clude the explanation of cultural variability, there is 
clear potential for evolutionary approaches in archaeol-
ogy. Despite this potential, archaeologists and anthro-
pologists disagree about the role and the degree to which 
processes of Darwinian evolution structure human be-
havior and the archaeological record (Maschner and 
Mithen 1996). Consequently, the integration of Darwin-
ian evolution into archaeological explanation takes place 
under a variety of schools that we identify here as dual 
inheritance theory (DIT), evolutionary archaeology 
(EA), human behavioral ecology (HBE), evolutionary 
psychology (EP), and cooperation and multilevel selec-
tion (CMS). While some of these approaches are often 
portrayed as competitive (Boone and Smith 1998), these 
schools are conceptually overlapping and all are founded 
on principles based in Darwinian evolution (table 8.1). 
Each varies substantially, however, in the way in which 
evolution is evoked as parts of explanation. 
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DUAL INHERITANCE THEORY
Boyd and Richerson (1985) were primarily respon-
sible for the initial development of DIT (see Collard et 
al., chapter 13). DIT holds that the variation, inheri-
tance, and natural selection of cultural traits are cor-
related, but as a distinct process from human genetic 
evolution. The focus of DIT is that unlike genetic 
information, cultural information is constantly passed 
between unrelated people. Interested in how genes 
and culture coevolve, Lumsden and Wilson (1981) 
envisioned cycles in which the individual is exposed 
to culturgens (parcels of culture) throughout life, re-
jecting, retaining, and incorporating new culturgens 
according to their genetic leash, or genetically based 
predilections to adopt certain behaviors while filtering 
out others. Each generation, most of these culturgens 
and epigenetic rules were recycled, but with small 
modifications guided by natural selection over many 
generations. One of the basic principles of DIT is that 
cultural evolution is a distinct, independent yet related 
process to biological evolution. This is the approach of 
Durham (1991: 26), whose version of what these dif-
ferent systems involve is summarized in table 8.2.
One of the issues of DIT is to evaluate the relative 
effects of horizontal transmission (between genetically 
unrelated people) from vertical transmission (from 
older to younger genetic relations) in cultural evolu-
tion. While vertical transmission appears to be the 
predominant path for the social learning of tradi-
tional craft skills (Heyes and Galef 1996; Shennan and 
Steele 1999; Avital and Jablonka 2000), the effects of 
horizontal transmission can be dramatic, as cultural 
traits can spread from one to one, one to many, many 
to one, or anything in between. As discussed in detail 
by Collard et al. (chapter 13), these forms of transmis-
sion can be biased in a variety of ways, such as toward 
prestigious individuals, through conformity, through 
novelty, and so on.
One of the contributions of DIT to the study of the 
archaeological record is the recognition of the signifi-
cant role that horizontal transmission in a variety of 
forms has in modeling human social and cultural evo-
lution (Ames 1996; Shennan 2002). Neiman (1995) 
adapted the neutral-trait model from population ge-
netics (Crow and Kimura 1970) to illustrate cultural 
drift by assuming perfect neutrality. In that a person is 
only as likely to copy his or her own variant as to copy 
anyone else’s. Bentley and Shennan (2003) propose 
that unbiased transmission (drift) inevitably results 
in a highly skewed distribution in the frequencies of a 
certain stylistic trait, meaning that a few highly popu-
lar styles can be expected to emerge over time. The 
neutral-trait model is remarkably powerful as a null 
hypothesis, allowing archaeologists to determine when 
other forces are acting in material culture evolution 
(Shennan and Wilkinson 2001). The ways in which 
the variation in an archaeological assemblage differs 
from the predictions of the neutral-trait model may be 
explained by natural selection and transmission pro-
cesses reduce or increase variation. Future studies may 
be used to explain how variability is transmitted across 
stylistic and functional dimensions (Neff 1993) in ar-
eas such as communication (Wobst 1977) and artifact 
manufacture process (Dietler and Herbich 1998).
One significant aspect of DIT is the independence 
that is maintained between cultural and biological 
evolution. One extreme version of this independence 
is memetics (Pulliam and Dunford 1980; Bloom 1995; 
Brodie 1995; Dennett 1995, 1998; Lynch 1996; Bar-
kow 1989; Durham 1991). Dawkins (1976) proposed 
memes as transmissible parcels of culture, which repli-
cate themselves like viruses and thus allow population 
genetics to be applied to cultural evolution. Seeing 
cultural phenomena spreading like viruses (Cullen 
2000) is fairly intuitive to most in the modern world 
of fast-spreading fads, chain-letter e-mails, and trendy 
Table 8.2. Differences in Biological versus Cultural Evolution
Evolutionary Component  Biological Evolution Cultural Evolution
Units of  Genes Memes
Sources of variation Mutation, recombination, Innovation, synthesis, migration,   
 migration diffusion.
Mechanisms of  Biological reproduction. Communication. Vertical, horizontal,   
inheritance Vertical, two parents with one  and oblique transmission. 
 or more offspring One “parent” variable offspring.
Mechanisms of Mutation, migration, drift, Frequency dependence, innovation,   
change natural selection migration, diffusion, drift, cultural  .  
  selection, natural selection, cultural
         and social differences in transmission
Source: After Durham 1991:table 8.1.
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phrases like “watch this space” that we find ourselves 
using without always knowing where we acquired it. 
Memes such as these spread horizontally and take 
less than a human generation to spread and often 
fade away. As mentioned above, Lumsden and Wilson 
(1981:27) used the term “culturgen,” and many other 
definitions (and names) for a cultural replicator have 
been proposed (Blum 1963; Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man 1981; Swanson 1973; Boyd and Richerson 1985; 
Cullen 2000). 
Proponents argue that the advantage of memetics 
lies in taking a “meme’s-eye” view (Dennett 1998), 
that is, to consider memes competing with each other 
in human brains (Dawkins 1976:211), which could 
explain why some of our behaviors are maladaptive. 
Ball (1984) listed four possibilities: (1) the meme 
helps itself and the host in replication, as in the idea 
of sex; (2) the meme is healthy for the host but not 
particularly heritable by itself, as in the idea of walking 
rather than driving to work in a commuter popula-
tion; (3) a highly heritable meme that is bad for the 
host, such as cigarette smoking; and (4) although ar-
guably rare, memes that are maladaptive  for both the 
host and the meme itself. A commonly cited example 
of the latter is the endo-cannibalism (eating the flesh 
of deceased relatives) among the Fore of Papua New 
Guinea, which caused a disease called Kuru (Barkow 
1989; Cronk 1999). 
Although evolutionary in structure, memetics of-
fers a framework for studying properties of cultural 
evolution that give it its particular form and structure 
(Lake 1998). Genetic evolution involves the differen-
tial reproductive success of genes that are transmitted 
in discrete events as physical chemical packages and 
that express themselves in the building of individ-
ual organisms from the encoded genotype (Dawkins 
1976). Memes, however, are simply information trans-
mission and produce any scale of phenomena from 
individual features to entire reproducing entities. In 
this way, memes have the potential to be cumulative 
and inherit the qualities of preceding and contempo-
raneous ones (Jablonka 2000). Science, for example, 
works this way as the process builds on the results and 
successful explanations of predecessors (Bentley and 
Maschner 2000; Hull 1988). The same goes for the 
definition of meme, which has changed from that of 
Dawkins (1976) to Ball (1984) to Durham (1991) to 
Lake (1998) to the current discussion. 
While we see that taking a meme’s-eye view can be 
quite useful, it is important not to carry the approach 
to the extreme, where human minds become pas-
sive vessels for memes (Blackmore 1998). At the very 
least, it can be said that memes do not compete on a 
blank slate because human culture and the brain act 
as filters and modifiers of memes (Ball 1984; Barkow 
1989; Cronk 1999; Lake 1998; Lumsden and Wilson 
1981; Sperber 1996). This raises the important point 
that one cannot have a theory for sociocultural change 
without specifying what actually changes and what 
the units are (Bronowski 1977; Dunnell 1978; Plotkin 
1994). Henrich and Boyd (2002) argue, however, that 
while mental representations are imperfect replicators 
at the individual level, they can still be accurate repli-
cators at the population level. In any case, the only way 
to know what the useful cultural units are is to mea-
sure their replicative success over time (Pocklington 
and Best 1997; Lipo and Madsen 2001; Leonard 1998; 
Lyman and O’Brien 2001). 
EVOLUTIONARY ARCHAEOLOGY
Evolutionary archaeology (EA) offers a paradigm for 
the explanation of the archaeological record based 
directly on the foundations of Darwinian evolution. 
Proponents of EA argue that archaeologists have much 
to gain from employing the theoretical framework 
that has been developed in evolution, specifically the 
concepts of natural selection and inheritance (Dun-
nell 1980). In fact, EAs see the lack of such a unified 
conceptual frameworks as one of the primary causes 
of the failure of the social sciences as a whole to live 
up to their promise (Sellars 1963; Rosenberg 1980). 
Thus EA is largely the product of a concerted effort to 
make use of explicit, falsifiable hypotheses generated 
from theory in the construction of explanations of the 
archaeological record (Dunnell 1982, 1992, 1989b).
EA identifies one of its largest challenges as adapt-
ing biological concepts into versions that can account 
for cultural variability (Dunnell 1995; Leonard and 
Jones 1987; Teltser 1995). In EA, this challenge is ad-
dressed by constructing measurement units that track 
frequencies of heritable traits of artifacts through time 
and across space, and to explain them in terms of 
transmission processes and the differential reproduc-
tive success brought about through natural selection, 
drift, and sorting. In this way, EA overlaps substan-
tially with DIT but tends to focus on the evolution of 
biological and cultural variability as a single integrated 
explanatory system rather than distinct theoretical 
components. Part of the reason for this kind of ex-
planatory framework is the conceptualization of what 
EA attempts to explain. EA is distinct in its focus on 
the archaeological record as the subject of explanation, 
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rather than behavior, people, the “past,” or any other 
phenomena not directly observable. When criticized 
for this (Boone and Smith 1998; Schiffer 1996), EAs 
reply that their focus is consistent with a model of sci-
ence that uses concepts to account for empirical mea-
surements (Eddington 1953; Lipo 2001; Sellars 1963). 
Phenotype-Genotype
EA proponents stress the construction of appropri-
ate units for measuring and explaining variability in 
the archaeological record. In biology, the standard 
means of measuring variability is to distinguish the 
genotype—the genetic instructions for replicating an 
organism—from the phenotype—the physical expres-
sion of those instructions. These units can obviously 
be used to account for the inheritance and construc-
tion of human biological features (hair color, build, eye 
color, etc.). The crux of this argument is that EAs argue 
that these units can also account for human artifacts 
and behavior, which of course are not produced by 
solely by genes. Understanding cultural transmission 
in the archaeological record requires analytical units 
that represent how it affected artifact manufacture, 
morphology, and use and deposition. EAs use this 
framework to establish artifacts as an additional part 
of our phenotype (Dunnell 1989; Leonard and Jones 
1987). The original discussion by Dunnell (1980), that 
the extended human phenotype includes tools in the 
same way that a bird phenotype includes its nest, cre-
ated a storm of controversy. Many readers understood 
the argument to be that artifacts were phenotypic ex-
actly as bird’s nests are, that is, without the key concept 
that a cultural genotype includes both cultural and 
genetic information. Critics (Boone and Smith 1998; 
Lake 1997; Larson 2000; Maschner 1998; Maschner and 
Patton 1996; see Gabora, chapter 17) pointed out that 
human cultural traits evolve much faster than human 
individuals or animal behaviors. In fact, EAs were not 
actually in disagreement with these undoubted realities 
(Madsen et al. 1999; Neff 2000). EAs have redefined 
the notions of phenotype and genotype to include 
all of the aspects of ourselves, including our bodies, 
behavior, and artifacts. This essentially resolves twenty 
years of miscommunication in which EAs were using 
the biological terms gene, genotype, and phenotype as 
conceptual tools, whereas critics assumed these terms 
carried the literal biological definitions (Cullen 2000).
EAs argue that their expanded, genetic-cultural view 
of the phenotype enables them to explain artifacts as 
a means by which individuals increase their fitness in 
their environment (now approaching similar domains 
in human behavioral ecology, discussed below) in a 
way that is empirically similar to the effect of spiders 
constructing webs or birds making nests. EAs do not 
dispute the distinction between human artifacts and 
spider webs and bird nests (see Gabora, chapter 17). 
The behaviors involved in nest and web construction 
are predominately genetically inherited, and birds and 
spiders can make a perfect nests and webs without ever 
having seen another one made (Dawkins 1982 and ci-
tations). Though these kinds of phenotypic extensions 
can vary in response to particular environments (i.e., 
are “plastic”) and can be modified through individual 
learning, the modified behaviors are not transmitted 
because the genes that control it are not. As a result, the 
next generation starts with the same biological basis 
for behavior (albeit with changes as determined by 
genetic inheritance and mutation), but not the modi-
fied behavior. What distinguishes EA is its argument 
that human artifacts can be conceived as portions of 
phenotypes, even though much of human behavior is 
learned and transmitted in a continuous fashion—not 
constrained by biological reproduction. 
Although using different definitions for phenotype, 
EA and DIT recognize that human behavior and ma-
terial culture evolve through cultural and biological 
transmission, and both approaches seek to resolve these 
pathways of inheriting information, and to determine 
how they interact (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; 
Boyd and Richerson 1985; Dunnell 1978, 1980, 1989; 
Leonard and Jones 1987; Lyman and O’Brien 2001). 
In some cases, cultural transmission and biological 
reproduction can be viewed as distinct processes, such 
that the replicative success of cultural traits need not 
be associated with the reproductive success of the 
bearer. In other cases, the success of a cultural trait 
affects the differential biological reproduction of the 
people using it, such that the variable success of these 
individuals becomes critical to the reproductive suc-
cess of the trait itself. In others, combinations of traits 
may be differentially replicating without clear impact 
to the biological success of the organisms involved in 
the replication procession. 
The fact that cultural and biological reproduction 
is sometimes independent and sometimes entangled 
is a source of confusion in some recent debates. Boone 
and Smith (1998:S147), for example, argued that if 
culture changes only through natural selection on hu-
man individuals, then cultural change rates would be 
limited by human generation length. Although culture 
elements that are decoupled from human survival can 
change much faster than human generation times 
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(e.g., cultural fashions), there are also many cases 
where the variable success of individuals who produce 
certain cultural traits is also critical (e.g., the spread 
of agriculture through dispersal of farming popula-
tions). In the latter case, success of cultural traits is 
tied to increases/decreases in relative frequencies of 
the people (i.e., changed in the number of biological 
organisms) who replicate the traits, which can change 
on timescales shorter than a generation. 
Proponents of EA do not reject the notion that cul-
tural traits can have fitness consequences for biological 
reproduction. Evolutionary archaeologists, however, 
go further to say that biological reproduction is not 
the only way in which traits can have fitness conse-
quences. Thus, rather than limit natural selection to its 
effects on biology, EA often makes use of the inclusive 
term “replicative success” (Leonard and Jones 1987; 
Lyman and O’Brien 2001), which invokes the idea that 
traits can have potential benefits to replicating entities 
at higher scales (i.e., replicators). Relative to classes 
of vessels, a persistent set of attributes, for example, 
may convey replicative success (Neff 1993), while an 
Acheulean hand ax may have enhanced the sexual 
attractiveness of the males who carried it (Kohn and 
Mithen 1999). For EA, fitness is assessed at the level 
of traits and their relations to replicators, rather than 
strictly to biological individuals and their reproduc-
tive output. In this way, the debate over “artifacts as 
phenotype” is largely a semantic argument, involving 
the traditional biological definition of “phenotype” 
versus the EA redefinition of the term. In fact, the EA 
approach includes genetic and cultural inheritance 
and the potential for differential success as multiple 
scales of analyses.
Intentionality
A controversial aspect of EA is the role that human 
intention plays in constructing explanations of the 
archaeological record. Although intention seems to be 
an obvious part of causation (since we invoke it as part 
of our everyday explanations of human behavior), it is 
not a necessary component of evolutionary explana-
tions. Dunnell (1989:37), for example, has argued that 
intention is as irrelevant to cultural evolution as oak 
tree intentions are to oak tree evolution. Much of the 
debate about EA centers on the meaning of such state-
ments (Boone and Smith 1998), with the contention 
largely due to at least two distinct usages of the notion 
intention. The first usage is related to intention as an 
explanation. In the conventional view, intentionality 
is the assumed relations between mental acts and the 
external world. We view doctors, for example, as in-
tending to contribute towards a cure for a patient, and 
we count them as successful in achieving those inten-
tions if they do. Similarly, we can look at artifacts and 
think that prehistoric individuals intended to build 
monuments and tools. This form of intention is part 
of our cultural means for accounting for observations 
human behavior. 
In contrast, EAs argue that intentionality used in 
this way is merely a manifestation of a cultural sense-
making system, and thus more or less irrelevant to 
science. “Intention” as a cause is part of our own 
common sense: our culturally inherited way of under-
standing everyday experience and attributing human 
action with purpose (Dunnell 1982). Commonsense 
systems for causation are what we replace through de-
velopment of science in the same way that physics and 
chemistry replaced “fire, earth, and water” as the basis 
for the world. Attributing intention as a cause is our 
explanation for the world (albeit cryptic and embed-
ded in common sense). EAs argue that their approach 
is the way to build a scientific sense-making system 
that is explicit (i.e., has theory) and is falsifiable (i.e., 
that has an empirical standard for determining verac-
ity). Since every culture, including our own, has its 
own sense-making system, this does not make our ex-
planatory system privileged in any absolute sense. EAs 
maintain that even science is only a particular kind of 
sense-making system, which is effective with respect to 
the tasks that scientists set out to achieve (Eddington 
1953; Sellars 1963; Wilson 1998).
Hence, whereas the more conventional view (i.e., 
transformation-based evolution) holds that purpose-
ful intentionality is an empirical phenomenon that has 
produced the variability observed in the archaeologi-
cal record, EA holds that human behavior is random 
with respect to natural selection through the evolu-
tionary process of variation generation and then sort-
ing of that variation (Leonard and Jones 1987; Rindos 
1989). This does not mean that EA claims that people 
act randomly (which would be nonsense), but instead 
that intentions cannot themselves be an explanation 
for behavioral change because intentions are part of 
behavior, and therefore the subject of inheritance and 
natural selection of behavioral regularities. 
In this way, the intentions themselves are also po-
tentially subject to evolution. This actually holds much 
in common with evolutionary psychology and human 
behavioral ecology (see below) in that evolution has 
shaped human cognition and what we refer to as 
“common sense.” In EA terms, the variability pro-
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duced by structured inheritance and innovation sys-
tems are the subject of explanation and this variability, 
in turn, affects the differential success of the systems 
that generate them (i.e., the replicators). Although 
seemingly abstract, this argument boils down to the 
basics of evolution in which our interest is explaining 
the differential persistence of traits. EA focuses, there-
fore, on tracking artifact variability in form and distri-
bution through time and across space as the result of 
a combination of innovation, inheritance, and sorting 
processes such as natural selection. Human behavior 
is certainly nonrandom and imbibed with intention, 
but EAs argue that this is only an observation of the 
fact that our behavior is strongly inherited (culturally 
and genetically) using systems that include the inheri-
tance of traits as well the inheritance of grammar (i.e., 
rules for generating traits and additional rules). This is 
what is meant when EA proponents say the intention 
critique conflates the tempo and mode of evolution 
(Lyman and O’Brien 1998, 2001).
Applications of EA
Applications of EA involve explanations of variabil-
ity in material culture observed in the archaeologi-
cal record using models of transmission and natural 
selection. One way of explaining the record is to use 
stylistic and functional classes to account for variation 
observed time and across space. Dunnell (1978) origi-
nally introduced the concepts style and function into 
EA as a way of accounting for the behavior of culture 
historical types. He explained culture historical classes 
as measurement units that attend to stylistic variabil-
ity, or variability that is predominately structured by 
transmission among populations. In the transmission 
of attributes in which fitness differences between vari-
ants are small, changes in relative frequencies are ex-
plicable as the result drift and random effects involved 
in transmission. (Bettinger and Eerkens 1997; Braun 
1991; Dunnell 1978; Lipo et al. 1997; Lyman and 
O’Brien 2000; Neff 1993; Neiman 1995; O’Brien 1996; 
O’Brien and Holland 1990). Measurements made us-
ing functional classes, on the other hand, emphasize 
performance differences and thus are explicable via 
natural selection. While these two kinds of measures 
have been mistaken as empirical claims (Sackett 2003), 
their distinction is a product of the way in which we 
study the world, not properties of things. In this for-
mulation, style and function are simply explanations 
for the behavior of certain kinds of classes that we use 
to measure the world in particular ways (Cochrane 
2001). Consequently, stylistic classes do not imply 
that an entity being measured lacks fitness, but rather 
that we are measuring entities in ways that do not 
reflect fitness differences. Likewise, functional classes 
are measures of the archaeological record that we use 
to generate observations that we can explain using the 
concepts of fitness and natural selection. 
For example, Allen (1995) accounted for the shape 
of the distal end of prehistoric Pacific fishhooks as 
the result of selection acting on functional variability 
because through this shape became larger on Pacific 
fishhooks and then stabilized, which was interpreted 
as selection. Feathers (1990; Dunnell and Feathers 
1990) argued that changes in prehistoric ceramics in 
the Mississippi valley from sand to shell temper was 
due to selection operating on performance differences 
of materials in changing firing regimes. 
In contrast, stylistic classes are used to measure 
variability controlled by transmission and drift. Nei-
man (1995), for example, showed that the changes in 
Woodland ceramics from Illinois over time were ex-
plicable largely as a function of transmission and neu-
tral (i.e., nonselective) traits. Similarly, Lipo (2001) 
demonstrated that the stylistic classes composed of 
decorative elements on late prehistoric ceramics from 
the Mississippi River valley could be used to track the 
relative degree of transmission among populations 
across space (e.g., an evolutionary approach to dif-
fusion). Studies of stylistic traits on fluted projectile 
points enabled O’Brien et al. (2001) to measure clade 
structure among prehistoric populations and track 
lineages of chipped stone technology in the south-
eastern United States. The same approach was used 
by Cochrane (2004) to track lineages of prehistoric 
ceramics in the Fiji islands. 
Another set of phenomena that has been explored 
by EA is the distribution of what is often described as 
cultural elaboration. Cultural elaboration is observed 
in the archaeological as monuments, elaborate burial 
goods, art, mounds, and other artifacts that are not di-
rectly related to individual human reproduction. Origi-
nally explained via the concept of waste by Dunnell 
(1989), the model has been integrated into a general 
evolutionary process known as bet hedging (Allen 2004; 
Aranyosi 1999; Hamilton 1999; Kornbacher 1999; Ko-
rnbacher and Madsen 1999; Madsen et al. 1999; Sterling 
1999). The model defines cultural elaboration as the 
product of selection that favors reduced rates of re-
production when subsistence resources are unpredict-
able (Dunnell 1989, 1999) given that, under conditions 
of high variance, the fittest strategy is not always the 
one involving the greatest number of offspring, given 
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the costs of birth and postnatal support (Seger and 
Brockman 1987). When resources are unpredictable, 
any behavior that reduces variance can potentially in-
crease long-term reproductive productivity and will be 
favored by natural selection. While there are a variety of 
means of individually achieving reduced reproduction 
rates, including birth spacing and parental investment, a 
population-level means can be through energy invested 
in cultural elaboration. In this way, cultural elaboration 
would be expected to occur in periods of high vari-
ance in subsistence-related resources (Hamilton 1999; 
Kornbacher 1999; Madsen et al. 1999; Sterling 1999), or 
spatially along variable margins of productive environ-
ments (Allen 2004; Aranyosi 1999; Dunnell 1999; Dun-
nell and Greenlee 1999; Madsen et al. 1999:253–254). 
While the bet hedging model potentially accounts 
for a wide range of cultural elaboration for variance re-
duction in unpredictable environments, this is hardly 
the only evolutionary account available—and it cer-
tainly is far from a complete explanation of all aspects 
of cultural elaboration. First, since we are studying 
historical phenomena, we must recognize that there 
are many evolutionary solutions to variance reduction 
and not all result in cultural elaboration that is visible 
in the archaeological record, or cultural elaboration 
at all. Alternative though lower ranked subsistence 
resources, for example, may be available. Fertility may 
be controlled through differential parental investment 
(Lack 1954; Mace 1996), a situation that has been ob-
served in small mobile population such as the !Kung 
San (Blurton Jones 1987). Human behavioral ecolo-
gists (discussed below) often discuss the demographic 
transition, which refers to the apparent paradox that 
wealthy societies often have lower birth rates, but 
which is probably due to the increased investment 
that parents in developed countries must make in their 
children (e.g., for education), such that they cannot 
afford to have as many children—this is actually quite 
similar to the bet hedging explanation. Mobility is also 
a possible solution to environmental unpredictability 
(Madsen et al. 1999; Núñez et al. 2002; Polyak and 
Asmerom 2001). Second, not all observed instances 
of cultural elaboration must be explained as the result 
of bet hedging. Investment in architecture and monu-
ments, for example, can be driven by changes in func-
tional organization among populations (Wenke 1981). 
The cessation of monument construction seen at the 
end of the Akkadian, Classic Maya, and Tiwanaku em-
pires (Binford et al. 1997; de Menocal 2001; Gill 2000; 
Weiss et al. 1993) are more likely attributable changes 
in the scale of functional organization. 
Third, part of the constraints being placed on 
cultural elaboration may be related to models advo-
cated by Boone (1998) and Neiman (1997)—mod-
els based on Zahavi and Zahavi’s (1997) handicap 
principle and the field of signaling theory. Models 
based on signaling theory are not necessarily alter-
natives to the bet hedging hypothesis but provide 
additional explanatory component. Costly signaling 
is one mechanism which may link elaboration to 
reproductive effort—and may explain why the ex-
pression of cultural elaboration consistently takes 
similar forms. Costly signaling and the dynamics of 
bet hedging in variable environments are compatible, 
rather than competing, explanations—and each pro-
vides complementary and supplementary explana-
tions of cultural elaboration—attending to different 
aspects of the record: distribution, intensity, form, 
and rate of change. 
Finally, the explanation of the evolution of bet 
hedging may require accounting for group-level phe-
nomenon. While bet hedging provides a means ex-
plaining cultural elaboration solely at the individual 
level, this can be insufficient for situations in which 
expressions of cultural elaboration involve coopera-
tive, group-level activities, rather than just sorting 
of the actions of individuals within a population. An 
excellent example is the construction of large burial 
mounds. While many mounds were constructed over 
considerable spans of time, most archaeologists would 
agree that at any point in time, mounds and mound 
complexes were not the work of single individuals. It is 
likely that in many cases burial mounds were the work 
of communities, working in concert. If so, we must 
evaluate the possibility that cultural elaboration on 
the part of an entire group, working in a coordinated 
fashion, may have fitness benefits both to individuals 
and to groups of which they are members. 
HUMAN BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY
In anthropology and archaeology, the use of behav-
ioral ecology is an outgrowth of Steward’s (1955) cul-
tural ecology as well as evolutionary ecology, which is 
the study of how evolutionarily adaptive designs per-
form in ecological contexts. Human behavioral ecol-
ogy (HBE) is evolutionary ecology applied to human 
behavior (Krebs and Davies 1997; Winterhalder and 
Smith 1992, 1999). HBE holds that diversity in human 
behavior results from result of selection which has 
shaped our ability to adapt to diverse social and eco-
logical environments (see Yesner, chapter 4). In HBE, 
human culture and behavior are forms of phenotypic 
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plasticity that allows humans to adapt to different so-
cial environmental and ecological conditions (Boone 
and Smith 1998; Smith 1991; Smith and Winterhalder 
1992; Winterhalder and Smith 1999). In other words, 
natural selection has resulted in a set of decision rules 
(Krebs 1978) rather than particular behaviors them-
selves. A decision rule follows a form such as, “in situ-
ation A, do X, in situation B, do Y, all other cases do 
Z” (Winterhalder 2002). A nonbehavioral example is 
the tanning response: If sunlight is intense, make skin 
darker color. If not, keep skin at its normal color. HBE 
argues that through flexible, goal-directed behavior, 
human cultural evolution often short-circuits natural 
selection (Boone and Smith 1998), and as a result cul-
tural behaviors often evolve toward economically op-
timal strategies. A behavioral example occurred upon 
the decline of big game during the North American 
Archaic, when humans chose the more optimal strat-
egy of hunting small game and foraging (Boone and 
Smith 1998). 
Critics of HBE argue that the emphasis on adapta-
tion effectively makes the approach equivalent to cul-
tural evolution—evolution built on transformation. 
Neff (2000) argues that behavioral flexibility could 
not evolve because most new cultural traits are unique 
to human evolution, and therefore cannot be part of 
an evolved package of behavioral choices. In HBE, 
however, behavioral flexibility itself is the adaptation 
rather than the specific behaviors themselves. For this 
reason, HBE places much more emphasis than EA 
on the effect of human agency in cultural evolution, 
which allows culture to change much more rapidly 
than biological evolution. Hence HBE often treats cul-
ture as a relatively minor extension of biological evo-
lution and that culture does not have any cumulative 
consequences (Flinn 1997; Boone and Smith 1998). 
The Phenotypic Gambit
Like any science, HBE rests on assumptions in or-
der to make its claims. One of the most basic and 
characteristic principle of HBE is what is commonly 
called the phenotypic gambit (Barrett, Dunbar, and 
Lycett 2002; Shennan 2002; Smith and Winterhalder 
1992). This refers to the thesis that, as Shennan puts 
it “with few exceptions, little is known about the way 
in which specific behaviours are influenced by genes, 
because there are likely to be many genes involved and 
the interactions between them and the environments 
in which they are expressed are complex” (Shennan 
2002:23). Taking this into account, people involved in 
HBE do not concern themselves with past evolution-
ary processes or with units of transmission nearly as 
much as those involved with DIT, EA, or EP do. They 
instead take current levels of fitness for adaptive strat-
egies as proxy measures for accessing the evolution of 
those strategies. This causes behavior and not genes to 
be the primary level of analysis. This is also a primary 
criticism that EP and EA have of HBE but also marks 
what may be the best place for these different positions 
to be of use to each other. As Barret, Dunbar, and Ly-
cett (2002) point out, HBE will be nothing but aided 
by linking their level of analysis with models generated 
by EP which is concerned with exactly what HBE isn’t 
(discussed below). Smith and Winterhalder (1992) tell 
us that the phenotypic gambit stems from another as-
sumption: extreme phenotypic plasticity.
Mary Jane West-Eberhard defines phenotypic plas-
ticity as “the ability of an organism to react to an envi-
ronmental input with change in form, state, movement 
or rate of activity” (West-Eberhard 2003:34). There 
are numerous ways that plasticity can come about, 
including multiple expressions from a particular ge-
netic combination and individual learning. Pheno-
typic plasticity also may affect phylogenic evolution 
in several ways, including one famous example, the 
Baldwin effect as described by Daniel Dennett (1991, 
1995). HBE utilizes phenotypic plasticity in at least 
two ways, first, with the idea of variation of behav-
ior and, second, with the related concept of rational 
choice—the ability for individuals to make choices 
which fundamentally alter their fitness. This, in turn, 
leads to the primary methods utilized by proponents 
of HBE, optimal foraging theory (described below). 
It also leads to discussions on different levels or scales 
of analysis and the possibility of group level selection 
(also discussed below). 
Rational Choice
HBE is partially predicated on the idea that humans 
are capable of making decisions about what sorts of 
strategies should be used in particular situations and 
that humans will attempt to optimize these strategies 
to fit whatever necessity there is. Given rational choice, 
energy expenditure or time expenditure or, in many 
cases, both, HBE assumes that there is an optimal way 
of doing this or that (Smith 1995). Rational choice is 
too similar to the concept of free will for some scholars 
is seen either as a different process working on evolu-
tion or as something ephemeral and possibly epiphe-
nomenal. Thankfully, the philosopher Daniel Dennett 
(1992, 1995, 1996, and 2003) has developed a body of 
work attempting to conceptualize how something like 
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rational choice can be fit into a Darwinian perspective 
without appealing to nonphysical or epiphenomenal 
causes. 
Dennett’s approach to this “problem” is a combi-
nation of Wittgenstein and universal Darwinism. He 
argues that many of the issues with free will are just 
problems with our use of language (1996). For the rest, 
Dennett proposes a universal view of Darwinism that 
situates the individual among many different influ-
ences each operating as part of a Darwinian system. 
Free will in this conception is not only misunderstood 
by being called such but is also the product of natural 
selection and a system of natural selection in its own 
right (2003). Dennett and other amenable philoso-
phers allow HBE molders (and the rest of us) the abil-
ity to continue our work without the need to brush up 
against these philosophical topics and to link different 
forms of natural selection into a manageable model. 
Optimal Foraging Theory
Optimal foraging theory (OFT), much like the claims 
of evolutionary archaeology, is founded in its em-
pirical dimensions and the ability to create testable 
hypotheses about behavioral phenomena. OFT is 
founded on decades of ecological investigations on a 
range of species that have shown that individuals tend 
to maximize their foraging return in relation to the 
costs of foraging. OFT predicts that, all things being 
equal, humans consistently weigh the benefits versus 
costs of their future actions, tending to make deci-
sions that maximize a particular variable, or currency 
(Stephens and Krebs 1986; Winterhalder and Smith 
1981; Jochim 1981). Currencies include energy, infor-
mation, time, technology, and risk, all of which can be 
used as the currency to be maximized (or minimized 
in the case of risk). It is often assumed with OFT that 
foragers use strategies with the maximum acquisition 
rate of food calories. In this case, all other variables, 
which can be estimated through ethnographic and 
other means, are assumed to be constant constraints 
in foragers’ choices. For example, the choice of fish-
ing strategy would be the one that harvests the most 
calories (the currency) in two weeks using nets, with a 
limited knowledge of salmon spawning behavior and 
no more than a certain amount of personal risk seen as 
the constraints. Such a situation can be modeled with 
classical economic equations, which are solved to find 
the strategy that produces the most calories. 
Some of this makes common sense in that, all 
things equal and given the choice, one would prob-
ably choose to spend two hours to harvest one cari-
bou rather than spending two weeks harvesting four 
hundred lemmings that have a combined meat weight 
equal to that of the caribou. Simple trade-off models 
like this, however, do not necessarily correspond with 
observed human behavior. Jochim (1981) wondered 
why the Cree would spend ten hours hunting a beaver 
in the spring when they could harvest a caribou in 
two hours. The failure to take into account choice, 
preference, or in this case fat content, might lead 
to some inaccurate conclusions. This is the reason 
most evolutionary ecologists use OFT as a screen onto 
which to project the actual data, using the deviations 
from optimality as a means of understanding cultural 
variations.
In the nonhuman world, assuming that an indi-
vidual would, for the most part, maximize energy or 
some other factor when foraging is not unique or even 
interesting. It is a basic facet of animal ecology. But 
among humans it is certainly complicated by social 
interactions. One of the major realizations of recent 
social and economic research is that interactions be-
tween people are at least as important as objective con-
stants defined with respect to an external environment 
(Hull 1988; Lake 1998), which profoundly questions 
whether rational choice, utility maximization, and op-
timal behavior are even valid assumptions (Keen 2003; 
Ormerod 1998, 2005; see Bentley and Maschner, chap-
ter 15). New approaches (see Costopolous, chapter 
16) suggest that more reasonable models are found in 
bounded rationality (Aurthur 1999)—a limited, local 
view of its environment, rather than an unrealistic, 
omniscient knowledge that is often assumed in OFT. 
HBE appears to work best in small, mobile forag-
ing groups with relatively simple goals (Winterhalder 
and Smith 1981) because under these conditions, 
any evolved adaptation for measuring foraging costs 
takes precedent over the social problems faced by 
more complex societies (see the next section). The 
more complex a society becomes, the more difficult 
it gets to make energy-maximizing choices, when 
many interacting specialists with different goals are 
reacting to each other’s actions as well as attempting 
to maximize different currencies, which include social 
and political motivations like avoiding conflict. For 
this reason, most applications of HBE have focused 
on hunter-gatherer groups and issues of food and sex 
(Mithen 1998). Typical HBE topics include foraging 
strategies, sexual division of labor, mating systems, al-
truism, food sharing, and fertility (Cronk et al. 2000). 
Using simple, logical mathematical models in concert 
with ethnographic observations, HBE has explored 
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issues for small-scale human groups (Winterhalder 
and Smith 1999). HBE predicts that by the time of 
Homo erectus, female hominids evolved to live long 
after menopause because this allowed grandmothers 
to help care for their grandchildren, thus bettering 
the survival chances of their own kin (Hawkes et 
al. 1998; O’Connell et al. 1999). HBE has been ex-
tended toward horticultural systems (Keegan 1986) 
and theories of agricultural origins. Smith (1995) 
argues that domestication of plants and animals by 
hunter-gatherers began as a method of reducing risk. 
Smith makes subsistence risk the prime currency to 
be minimized in his model of Late Mesolithic hunter-
gatherer behavior, while genetic changes in plants and 
animals serve as constraints that guided behaviors 
toward domestication. 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Evolutionary psychology (EP) takes the idea that be-
havioral flexibility evolved in hominids as an adapta-
tion a step or two further than other approaches. EP 
takes as a starting assumptions that human cognitive 
abilities and behavioral tendencies evolved during the 
Plio-Pleistocene and that we can explain behavior since 
that point as the product of past evolutionary changes 
(Pinker 2002; Tooby and Cosmidies 1989). Research in 
cognition has shown that solving even simple cogni-
tive tasks requires “innate” abilities that are complex in 
design and organization (Chomsky 1980, 1996; Fodor 
1983; Pinker 2002) and thus can only be the product 
of long-term evolution, which, like parts of EA and 
HBE, can be tested through rigorous empirical research 
and hypothesis testing. EP assumes that over 3 million 
years as Plio-Pleistocene hominids existed within small 
kin-based groups with mobile foraging subsistence 
economies, human cognition evolved to reflect general 
solutions to characteristic problems. Just like a complex 
structure such as the eye, these evolved psychological 
mechanisms operate on complex tasks without con-
scious awareness (Tooby and Devore 1987), and further 
like the eye or the structure of the hand, are sufficiently 
complex that selection will not act on them over short 
evolutionary time.
EP bases many of is assumptions on psychological 
studies. For example, controlled studies revealing that 
people shown photographs of a variety of different 
natural landscapes generally prefer open woodland, 
savannas (Orians and Heerwagen 1992), suggest that 
this pan-cultural preference evolved on the African 
savanna. Other studies indicate gender-based differ-
ences in concepts of landscapes, in that women are 
better at remembering the spatial relationships among 
objects, while men generally have better long-distance 
mental maps (Silverman and Eals 1992). Because males 
hunt and women gather in most historically observed 
hunting and gathering societies, EPs argue that the 
male spatial ability is effective for hunting on a wide 
landscape, while the better local memory in females 
evolved for gathering plants from a relatively restricted 
area. If true, the implications for archaeology would 
be profound. For example, in regions where gathered 
foods are dominant, such as east Africa, site locations 
should be based on women’s knowledge, with the op-
posite true in the Arctic where hunting provides nearly 
all energy (Maschner 1996b).
The goal of EP is to discover what algorithms exist 
in human cognition, and to explore how these mecha-
nisms create and maintain cultural phenomena (Bar-
kow 1989a; Cosmidies and Tooby 1987; Daly and 
Wilson 1997; Tooby and Cosmidies 1989; Tooby and 
DeVore 1987). In contrast with HBE, EP does not focus 
on the adaptive consequences of modern behaviors, 
and in fact does not assume that any behaviors in the 
modern world will be adaptive except by chance (Bar-
kow 1989a; Tooby and Cosmidies 1989). Rather, propo-
nents of EP suggest that we are all cognitively adapted 
to small, kin-based and mobile foraging groups and 
with the rise of more complex social forms, we can no 
longer be expected to behave adaptively because we are 
so far removed from our environment of evolutionary 
adaptiveness (EEA). With the rise of the Neolithic, for 
example, when humans first experienced multiple kin 
groups, sedentism, and a nonforaging economy, social 
change occurred at rates far faster than natural selection 
is able to track. Thus we have a Pleistocene psychology 
that was forced to deal with an urban social world that 
is often incongruous with our adaptive abilities (Tooby 
and Cosmidies 1989:35; Maschner 1996c). 
Evolutionary psychology provides framework for 
the explanation of human behavioral evolution, for 
example, building on evidence for hard-wired, special-
ized intelligence modules in the human brain (Cos-
medes and Tooby 1989:113; Gardner 1985; Mithen 
1996). There are several versions of the modularity 
model. Pinker (2002) supports the massively modu-
lar conception which views the mind as being totally 
comprised of these modules each containing other 
modules which contain other modules and so forth in 
a hierarchical format. The moderately massive mod-
ular (Sterenly 2003) conception limits the amount 
of modules to specific domains;, what domains are 
modular, however, is contentious. 
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Plotkin (1994) situates evolutionary psychology in 
what he calls the secondary heuristic. The primary 
heuristic is genetic evolution which gave rise to the 
secondary heuristic or an evolving cognitive structure 
which in turn gives rise to the tertiary heuristic or 
culture and social reality. Each of these heuristics is 
linked to the other ones in both a feed forward and a 
feedback loop, that is, each heuristic was created by the 
previous one and created the following one. But once 
a heuristic gave rise to another heuristic, the latter 
heuristic then became part of the selection upon the 
previous heuristic (Plotkin 1994). In Dennett’s (1995) 
words, evolutionary psychology is a crane—a tool 
with a foundation that allows us to lift other theories 
using it as a foundation.
EP Applications
Mithen (1996) argues that the development and sub-
sequent integration of these distinct modules, which 
he categorized as natural history, social, technical, lan-
guage, and general intelligences, was fundamental to 
the evolution of human behavior. The development 
of a particular module such as technical intelligence, 
for example, may explain the excellent skill of Nean-
derthals in making Levallois points, compared with 
their limited ability for language, if any. Revolutions in 
human behavior occurred when distinct intelligence 
modules became integrated. According to this model, 
the sudden proliferation of art in the Upper Paleolithic 
resulted from evolved communication between the 
social and natural history intelligences, which allowed 
abstract natural symbolism to be used for communi-
cation (Mithen 1996). 
Sperber and Hirschfeld (2004) make an argument 
that certain aspects of not only intercultural similarity 
(as most evolutionary psychologists would claim) but 
also cultural differences and stability may be account-
able by cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. 
They are quick to state that “we agree with standard 
social science that culture is not human psychology writ 
large and that it would make little sense to seek a psycho-
logical reductionist explanation of culture.” However, 
they would like to see modularity taken into account as 
an (not the) engine for cultural differences and stability 
(two of the requirements for evolution). If modules are 
domain specific, then cultural representations may be 
anchored in particular modules or complex cultural 
manifestations such as religion may be anchored in sev-
eral modules (Sperber and Hirschfeld 2004).
Another example of applied EP is Gil-White’s 
(2001) argument that ethnic stereotyping is an out-
growth of our evolved capacity to differentiate natu-
ral species, such that we instinctively, unintentionally 
classify ethnic groups as different essences. Gil-White 
further argues that our tendency to socialize within 
our own ethnic group evolved as its own mental mod-
ule, which was selected for because of the advantages 
to being well-versed in the operating social customs, 
and the tendency for social groups to punish those 
who do not conform. But it may simply be a product 
of in-group/out-group behavior, which provides the 
means to recognize those related to you versus those 
who are strangers.
While proponents of EP do not believe there is a 
mental module for every human behavior (contra 
Ehrlich 2000 and Gould 2000), we must be cautious of 
a sort of adaptationism (Gould and Lewontin 1979) 
and functionalism that Dennett (1995) refers to as the 
misguided “sky hook” idea that evolution pulls things 
toward an optimal design. Not every human behavior 
is adaptive, especially those with negligible or neutral 
consequences for reproduction. If we consider ethnic 
stereotypes to be a form of imagined kin groups (Jones 
2000), there need be no specialized mental module for 
it, since the organisms are inclined by inclusive fitness 
to favor their own kin. A specialized ability for gossip 
may have evolved in females in competing for im-
portant social information concerning resources and 
mates (Barkow 1992; Dunbar 1996; Hess and Hagen 
2002), but gossip could also have arisen naturally from 
information communication about all sorts of things, 
including the landscape, location of food resources, 
and so on. 
Theological arguments aside, religion might result 
from our evolved instinct to acquire gossip about ev-
eryone else, and hence to envisage omniscient deities 
who communicate such information with us (Boyer 
2001), or it could have no adaptive value at all, hav-
ing emerged from the complex interaction of mental 
abilities—an accident of our evolution, a “spandrel” 
(Gould and Lewontin 1979). That said, evidence for 
the distinct existence or evolution of such evolved 
cognitive mechanisms leads to extraordinary explana-
tive potential regarding human behavior. Support for 
the special evolution of gossip comes from the fact 
that girls gossip more competitively and aggressively 
than boys (Bjorkqvist et al. 1992; Eckert 1990; Eder 
and Hallihan 1978), the direct relevance of gossip to 
finding a reliable mate, and the prevalence of patri-
locality in prehistory (Bentley et al. 2002; Seilestad et 
al. 1998;), which Hess and Hagen (2002) take to infer 
female competition. 
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Even in language, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) use 
evolutionary psychology as a foundation for their 
analysis of metaphors. To them many metaphors take 
on a spatial theme because the neurons used to negoti-
ate physical space are likely the same ones that are used 
to navigate conceptual space and that our conceptual 
categories are also influenced by spatial categories 
and by virtue of our being neural beings. This type of 
analysis has implications for the social sciences that 
are not generally seen to be amenable to evolutionary 
psychology. With the ideas of Sperber and Hirschfeld 
(2004), Plotkin (1994), Lakoff and Johnson (1999), 
and a growing number of others, the social sciences 
are having a new engine for difference and similarity 
developed for them that will not replace any of the 
other equally important engines currently used for 
analysis. These type of studies will have powerful im-
plications for understanding past social dynamics.
While discussing HBE, we noted that foraging the-
ory tends to be less successful in explaining the eco-
nomic behavior of more complex groups. EP gives us 
the mechanism for investigating this problem. If we 
have evolved mechanisms for living in small, mobile 
groups, cognitive modules that evolved over several 
million years on the African landscape, then the only 
modern groups who should exhibit cost effective for-
aging should be foragers, the groups closet to the en-
vironment of evolutionary adaptiveness (EEA). As we 
moved into villages with a number of unrelated people 
or kin groups, we would have had to create social 
mechanisms to adapt to these new conditions because 
these adaptive modules are too complex for natural 
selection to act on in the short term. Thus we would 
expect villages and others to develop social solutions 
to make up for the fact that we do not have the mental 
adaptations for living in the same place all year with 
a bunch of unrelated people. Thus we would expect 
villages and those in state-level societies to sacrifice 
foraging efficiency and maximize social and political 
efficiency, and this is indeed the case (Maschner 1992, 
1996b).
EP can also solve the problem of altruism as well. 
As described in the next section, some evolutionary 
biologists have argued that altruistic behavior, be-
yond that of kin selection, may be evidence of group 
selection. But if the cognitive ability for kin selection 
developed in the context of kin-based groups and 
was reinforced over millions of years, then altruistic 
behavior to nonkin might just be an accident of his-
tory. For example, why do some people spontaneously 
put their life in jeopardy to save a random person in 
peril? The answer lies in the fact that for millions of 
years, there is a very good chance that this person 
would have been related in some why, thus satisfying 
the tenets of kin selection. But humans have only been 
consistently interacting with many unrelated people 
for a few thousand years, far too short for selection 
to act on such a complex trait. Thus, rather than 
group selection as a mechanism, perhaps many of our 
decisions are actually based on the fact that our deci-
sion-making abilities are built on millions of years of 
kin-based interactions, a condition that has not yet, 
been sufficiently investigated.
Many archaeologists over the past decade have used 
terms such as aggrandizers, status strivers, and chiefly 
thugs to frame new approaches to the rise of complex 
hunter-gatherers (Ames, chapter 28; Hayden 1998; 
Maschner 1992; Maschner and Reedy-Maschner 1998) 
that see status competition as critical to understand-
ing these changing social dynamics. Evolutionary 
psychologists have been interested in our cognitive 
adaptations for status competition (Wrangham and 
Peterson 1996) and archaeologists are beginning to 
investigate the cognitive foundations for these behav-
ioral assumptions (Maschner 1992; 1996b). Further, 
while many evolutionary psychologists are investigat-
ing our innate abilities, such as status striving, risk 
assessment, in group/out group behavior, kin selection 
and altruism, the ability to weigh costs and returns, 
and our innate skills at detecting cheaters, perhaps 
the more interesting aspects of behavior are those for 
which we have no innate abilities. These include living 
in complex social groups and religion, or those innate 
abilities that are manipulated to do other things, such 
as our ability to form fictive kin groups in order to go 
to war or to form academic archaeology departments. 
The social and political problems so prevalent in the 
modern world are just those issues for which evolu-
tionary psychology can find no innate abilities. This 
is the fundamental reason why EP does not propose 
that any modern behaviors are adaptive (contra HBE), 
since we no longer live under any of the environmental 
conditions that created our innate abilities through 
natural selection (Barkow et al. 1992). 
Evolutionary psychology in archaeology will not 
be tested directly. Rather, EP defines the limits, the 
boundaries, and creates expectation for how we would 
expect the past to look. Much like optimal foraging 
theory, it allows us to use it as a screen on which we can 
project the past. It further defines specific realms of 
behavior that we can in turn use as basic assumptions 
for investigating complex social phenomena.
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COOPERATION AND MULTILEVEL SELECTION
One common position in evolutionary biology is that 
throughout evolution, natural selection has acted pri-
marily on genes, which must replicate accurately and 
often, as well as last durably in order to survive. Multi-
cellular organisms, including people, exist as survival 
machines evolved for the sole purpose preserving and 
transmitting their selfish genes (Dawkins 1976). In this 
view, the larger the unit of analysis gets from the scale 
of the gene, as with individual organisms, species, or 
even human groups, the more unlikely it becomes to 
consider natural selection acting on that unit. Selection 
on human groups is particularly problematic since it 
would seem that selfish individuals could always out-
compete their cooperative neighbors by taking advan-
tage of them. How then did altruism, cooperation, and 
social organizations develop? One way to resolve this, 
without sacrificing the selfish gene concept, is the idea 
of inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964; cf. Maschner and 
Patton 1996 for an archaeological example)—even if 
the person carrying a gene does not survive, a gene can 
be passed into the next generation if the person’s rela-
tives (who carry many of the same genes) survive. The 
theory that caring grandmothers increase the survival 
chances of their own grandchildren (Hawkes et al. 
1998; O’Connell et al. 1999), for example, is founded 
in the inclusive fitness concept. 
While kin selection is useful in cases where there is 
strong relatedness among populations, it does not ex-
plain cooperation among unrelated individuals. One 
way in which this question has been addressed is 
through the use of mathematical game theory (Nash 
1953; von Neumann and Morganstern 1944; Shen-
nan 2002; Skyrms 1996). The classic example of game 
theory is the prisoner’s dilemma, which involves two 
players who each decide whether or not to cooper-
ate with authorities in efforts to minimize their own 
prison sentences. If neither criminal confesses, both go 
free; if one confesses, the other receives a stiff sentence; 
if both confess, they each receive moderate sentences. 
The dilemma is that fearing treachery, each informs on 
the other, yielding the worst possible outcome. This is 
known as the tragedy of the commons, examples of 
which include the ways humans from the Pleistocene 
to the present day have repeatedly overexploited their 
environment to the detriment of everyone (Alroy 
2001; Hardin 1968; Jackson et al. 2001; Roberts et al. 
2001). 
The tragedy of the commons is avoidable if mu-
tual cooperation always carries a higher benefit than 
defection, because in such cases there is no dilemma. 
Group selection is therefore possible when the in-
terests of the individual coincide with the group 
(Shennan 2002; Williams and Williams 1957; Wilson 
1998). For example, food sharing does not benefit 
the individual hunter directly, but it does benefit the 
hunter’s group and therefore benefits the hunter in-
directly with respect to groups of nonsharing hunters 
(Wilson 1998). In such cases, selection on the group 
level might be stronger than at the individual level, 
leading to the differential survival of groups with 
greater degrees of cooperation (Traulsen and Nowak 
2006). At the individual level, this is still individual 
selection because the individual benefits from par-
ticipation in the group and playing by the group’s 
rules are critical to an individual’s fitness. It gets 
interesting at the level of multiple competing groups 
where it is not only advantageous at the individual 
level, but where the group becomes an emergent en-
tity as well, and then group-level selection might play 
a significant role.
Even with prisoner’s dilemma and other games in-
volving a logical temptation to defect, however, coop-
eration can emerge when they are played repeatedly 
among many interacting individuals. It is important 
whether or not each player retains a memory, which 
allows strategies that react to previous interactions 
(Cox et al. 1999). A surprisingly simple and success-
ful strategy is tit-for tat (Axlerod 1984), by which an 
agent defects when its previous opponent defects, and 
cooperates when its previous opponent cooperates. 
If many players are allowed to play each other and 
live and die by these games, tit-for-tat emerges as an 
evolutionarily stable strategy; that is, it tends to win 
out over unstable alternatives as always defect and 
always cooperate. For example, if all players cooper-
ate, then one cheater can defect on everyone it meets, 
winning every time and multiplying until defectors 
start to dominate the population, and everyone loses 
as the outcomes become the worst possible. End-
less variations of games and strategies are possible 
but in general, strategies that involve reciprocity are 
evolutionarily stable—they cooperate when cooper-
ated with in past encounters, or defect when mostly 
defected on (Bowles and Gintis 2000; Danielson 2002; 
Nowak and Sigmund 1998; Sethi and Somanthan 
2001). 
Cooperation can emerge even among selfish indi-
viduals without memory, in simulated games where 
individuals bear tags to identify those with similar 
strategies (Riolo et al. 2001). As a mechanism play-
ers use to discriminate us from them, tags might be 
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viewed as a reversion to kin selection (Sigmund and 
Nowak 2001), but cultural tags lead to cooperation 
among unrelated individuals when the group has a 
system of strong reciprocity. In which nonconform-
ists are punished and “normal” behavior is rewarded 
(Bowles and Gintis 2000; Henrich and Boyd 2001). 
Even among primates, aggression is constrained by 
the need to maintain beneficial relationships (de Waal 
2000). Strong reciprocity may explain the evolution 
of prosocial traits—rules of conduct whose increased 
frequency in a population enhances the level of well-
being of its members (Bowles and Gintis 2000). Con-
trolled ethnographic experiments suggest that people 
in large and small-scale societies everywhere make 
economic deals based on social concepts of fairness 
rather than individual self-interest (Camerer 1997; 
Henrich et al. 2006; Roth et al. 1991). While evolution-
ary psychologists might see this as a kin-based trait 
transposed into the modern world, the end product is 
clearly an adaptation to living in complex social units 
far beyond the kin group.
Sober and Wilson (1998) have shown that multi-
level selection can explain group-beneficial behaviors 
in situations where selection between groups over-
comes the selection for selfish individual behaviors 
within each group. In many cases of multilevel selec-
tion, the spatial structure of groups can be enough 
to allow group-beneficial traits to increase overall 
within a population, even though there is selection 
for individuals who are selfish within each group. 
This surprising result derives from the benefits that 
cooperative individuals have on the overall success 
of groups (even though cooperation is self-interest). 
Altruism can persist and succeed despite the apparent 
benefits of selfishness. On this basis, any mechanisms 
that suppress variation within groups will enhance the 
efficacy of selection between groups and thus increase 
the likelihood that group-level behavior persists. 
In this way, we can see that evolution can result in 
the selection for organization at a variety of levels: 
from simple redundant individuals, to the level of 
the herd where individuals benefit from some shared 
activity, to complex social groups where individuals 
are mutually dependent on one another. Future re-
search will extend the quantitative model of multilevel 
selection to multiple groups using Price’s covariance 
approach (Sober and Wilson 1998; Price 1970). This 
will enhance the explanatory power of the evolution-
ary model for situations in which group organization 
is clearly present and affecting the fitness of cultural 
entities. 
CONCLUSION
We know that going to the Moon was a simple 
task indeed, compared with some others we 
have set for ourselves, such as creating a hu-
mane society or a peaceful world. 
—Herbert Simon (1996:139)
While few archaeologists would profess to doubt the 
validity of evolutionary theory as a means for ex-
plaining our biological origins, there has been much 
debate over how and the degree to which evolutionary 
principles should be applied in archaeology (Bam-
forth 2002, 2003; Boone and Smith 1998; Kehoe 2000; 
Maschner 1996c,d, 2003; Maschner and Mithen 1996; 
Mithen 1998; Pauketat 2004; Schiffer 1996, 2004). The 
positions in this debate vary in form. Some researchers 
limit evolution to its effects in biological reproduction 
and suggest that human behavior is a product of evo-
lution that occurred in the past (Mithen 1998). Some 
argue that if evolution is differential biological repro-
duction, then it cannot account for the fast, flexible 
adaptiveness of humans (Bamforth 2002, 2003). Oth-
ers equate Darwinian change with transformational 
cultural evolution (Kehoe 2000) or concepts used for 
measures with real entities (Schiffer 2004). Still others 
reject explicit scientific goals and maintain the need 
for disciplinary heterogeneity (Hegmon 2003; Kehoe 
2000; Pauketat 2004) or assert the primacy of human 
agency as the mechanism for change (Pauketat 2004; 
Schiffer 1996). 
Although there is disagreement, all of the ap-
proaches outlined in this chapter share a goal of ex-
plaining the archaeological record, human history, 
and cultural change as the product of past or ongoing 
evolution. None of the approaches, however, is entirely 
adequate in terms of units for measurement, meth-
ods for generating expectations, clarity of language, 
dynamic completeness, and empirical sufficiency. We 
have yet, for example, to develop a good measure of 
the tolerance limits for our alternative hypotheses 
and are still deriving exemplars for what evolution-
ary explanations look like (Bettinger and Richerson 
1996). Consequently, as documented in this chapter, 
the myriad of evolutionary approaches available to 
the archaeologist are often incompatible, competi-
tive, and even hostile to one another. Some of these 
debates are at least partly semantic, demonstrating 
the need for mutually agreed definitions of terms 
such as “phenotype” and the need to cross the lan-
guage barrier between approaches that often discuss 
very similar issues with different vocabulary (Mithen 
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1989); for instance, agency theory speaks of agency 
instead of intentionality and structuration rather than 
selection. Although there are differences in interpreta-
tion, more communication between the different ap-
proaches could only help; many of the other debates 
are profound and not unique to evolutionary science. 
Understanding the historical nature of human change 
brings up deep questions of how cognition works, as 
well as the philosophical foundations of science (Hull 
1988) and archaeology (see Koerner and Price, chapter 
21). These are healthy questions, and from an evolu-
tionary perspective the variability of approaches is a 
good sign: it is the mark of a vibrant discipline gener-
ating variants along as many dimensions as possible as 
it makes it way down an evolutionary path leading to 
increasing explanatory power (Hull 1988; O’Brien et 
al. 2005). This is the way science works and if our goal 
is to build a science, this kind of diversity is expected 
(and desirable). 
For example, HBE is often phrased as a competi-
tive explanatory framework to EA and DIT (Boone 
and Smith 1998). HBE is not necessarily in conflict 
with other evolutionary approaches to the study of 
the archaeological record (Neff 2000). HBE provides a 
robust means for studying the fitness consequences of 
variability in the behavioral component of the human 
phenotype. Cannon (2000, 2001), for example, studied 
changes in faunal remains and subsistence activities 
among prehistoric populations of the Mimbres valley 
in the American Southwest and convincingly dem-
onstrated that selection on resource returns resulted 
in a shift from hunting large mammals to cultivating 
plants. Cannon’s study uses HBE models to develop 
fitness estimates for behavior under varying condi-
tions. Similar to the study of the engineering perfor-
mance of artifacts (Feathers 1990; Kornbacher 2001; 
Pierce 2005; Pfeffer 2001; Wilhelmsen 2001), HBE 
models allow one to develop expectations for how 
natural selection will favor variability in the behavior 
component of the phenotype (Maxwell 1995). In this 
way, HBE enables researchers to explain changes in 
trace fossils, artifacts that are not directly part of the 
phenotype but are produced by the interaction of phe-
notype and the environment. 
In looking at the past twenty years or so, one might 
characterize EA, DIT, HBE, and EP with different goals 
and interpretations, as this chapter has described. 
Without a doubt they all offer insights into investigat-
ing the evolution of humanity in the context of genes, 
behaviors, decisions, or all in concert. It is important 
for the next generation of archaeological theorists to 
evaluate the pros of cons of these past approaches. 
One should not feel obligated to be an evolutionary 
archaeologist or a human behavioral ecologist per se, 
since these are just artificial disciplinary boundaries 
that emerged from the differences in past thought, 
and need not determine the direction of future theory. 
There are many ways of making use of evolutionary 
principles for generating explanations, each empha-
sizing different aspects of the underlying Darwinian 
framework. Ultimately, the question of what is “right” 
depends on what one is trying to explain and what is 
sufficient to account for the observed phenomenon. 
In this way, evolutionary science itself is a process of 
change, developing new hypotheses as new informa-
tion becomes available. So for any newcomer to un-
critically subscribe to the entire thought package of 
any one team is just feeble conformism. 
Going forward, we can expect to see increased so-
phistication in evolutionary models that consider the 
effects of continuous transmission sorted by local 
processes creating variants that succeed differentially 
over time and space (Bentley et al. 2004; Bentley and 
Shennan 2003; Eerkens and Lipo 2005). We can ex-
pect to see greater use of genetics to study biological 
relatedness among prehistoric populations using trace 
remains of DNA (Jones 2003; Kimura et al. 2001; 
Newman et al. 2002) and the use of cladistics-based 
methods to trace relatedness among cultural variants 
(Lipo et al. 2005; Mace et al. 2005). We can also expect 
to see increasingly sophisticated models for studying 
the fitness of behavioral variants (Cannon 2003), new 
ways of understanding human cognition and its evo-
lutionary origins (Barrett et al. 2002; Dorus et al. 2004; 
Dunbar 2003). 
Just by addressing questions with evolutionary the-
ory, we are able to frame questions about ourselves (e.g., 
human intentionality, the nature of cultural change, 
artifact variability) in a logical light, cleared as much as 
possible of the biases we have by being human. Evolu-
tionary inquiries provide a means for studying aspects 
of ourselves in way that provide falsifiable accounts of 
the archaeological record. While the details are yet be-
ing worked out, what we can say with certainty is that 
archaeology which uses evolutionary explanations is 
likely emerge into a powerful and robust discipline. But 
we will never have a unified approach to Darwinism in 
archaeology until we all become simultaneously evo-
lutionary archaeologists, human behavioral ecologists, 
evolutionary psychologists, and dual-inheritance theo-
rists—in other words, stay focused on science as a fluid 
process of using all our information to build the best 
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